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Prevention through design: trade-offs in reducing occupational health and safety 
risk for the construction and operation of a facility 
 
Research Paper 
 
Abstract 
 
Purpose – The research explores the interaction between design decisions that reduce 
occupational health and safety (OHS) risk in the operation stage of a facility’s life cycle 
and the OHS experiences of workers in the construction stage. 
Design/methodology/approach – Data was collected from three construction projects in 
Australia. Design decisions were examined to understand the reasons they were made and 
the impact that they had on OHS in the construction and operation stages. 
Findings – The case examples reveal that design decisions made to reduce OHS risk 
during the operation of a facility can introduce new hazards in the construction stage. 
These decisions are often influenced by stakeholders external to the project itself. 
Research limitations/implications –The results provide preliminary evidence of 
challenges inherent in designing for OHS across the lifecycle of a facility. Further 
research is needed to identify and evaluate methods by which risk reduction across all 
stages of a facility’s life cycle can be optimised. 
Practical implications – The research highlights the need to manage tensions between 
designing for safe construction and operation of a facility.  
Originality/value – Previous research assumes design decisions that reduce OHS risk in 
one stage of a facility’s life cycle automatically translate to a net risk reduction across the 
life cycle. The research highlights the need to consider the implications of PtD decision-
making focused on one stage of the facility’s life cycle for OHS outcomes in other stages. 
 
Keywords: Prevention through design, Occupational health and safety, construction, 
operational safety, industry policy. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 Prevention through Design (PtD) 
James Reason (1997) suggests that organizational accidents occur as a result of the 
complex interaction between organizational and workplace factors and individuals’ 
actions. In some situations, a system’s defences fail as a result of latent or underlying 
conditions which can originate “upstream” of the work itself. In construction, the design 
of a building or structure has been identified as a causal factor in workplace accidents. In 
Australia, the National Occupational Health and Safety Commission reported that 37% of 
210 workplace fatalities definitely or probably involved design-related issues (NOHSC, 
2004). In the USA, Manuele (2008) noted workplace or work process design to be a 
causal factor in 35% of industrial accidents. Based on the mounting evidence that design 
contributes to accidents, ‘Prevention through Design’ (PtD) has emerged as a key 
occupational health and safety (OHS) policy issue in many countries (Creaser, 2008). For 
example, Australia’s National Occupational Health and Safety (OHS) Strategy 2002 – 
2012 identified “eliminating hazards at the design stage” as one of five priority areas 
(NOHSC 2002).   
 
Definitions of PtD reflect the need for OHS hazards presented by a design to be identified 
and eliminated or, if elimination is not practicable, the risk presented by that hazard is to 
be reduced to as low as reasonably practicable (a requirement sometimes referred to as 
the ALARP principle).  This creates the need for decision-makers to apply a risk 
management methodology and also presents challenges for decision-makers. These will 
be described in a subsequent section.  
 
Most definitions of PtD imply designers should address hazards across the entire life 
cycle of a product. For example, the US National Institute for Occupational Safety and 
Health (NIOSH) defines PtD as “addressing occupational safety and health needs in the 
design process to prevent or minimize the work-related hazards and risks associated with 
the construction, manufacture, use, maintenance, and disposal of facilities, materials, and 
equipment” (italics added). Schulte et al. (2008, p.115) define PtD as “the practice of 
anticipating and ‘designing out’ potential occupational safety and health hazards and risks 
associated with new processes, structures, equipment, or tools, and organizing work, such 
that it takes into consideration the construction, maintenance, decommissioning, and 
disposal/recycling of waste material, and recognizing the business and social benefits of 
doing so" (italics added). 
 
PtD in construction 
Research has shown a link between design and safety in the construction industry.  An 
analysis of 100 non-fatal incidents in the United Kingdom revealed that, in approximately 
half of the cases, an alteration to the permanent works design would have reduced the risk 
of the accident (HSE 2003; Gibb et al. 2004). In the USA, Behm (2005) undertook a 
review of 224 construction fatalities, finding that, in 94 cases (42%) the design was 
linked to the incident. Gambatese et al. (2008) validated Behm’s findings using an expert 
panel to review a subset of the 224 fatalities originally analysed. In Australia, Driscoll et 
al. (2005) report 44% of construction fatalities to be related to design, although they 
acknowledge that ‘informational difficulties’ made it difficult to ascertain whether these 
fatalities could be attributed to: (i) the permanent design of the building/structure, (ii) the 
design of plant/equipment, or (iii) the design of the process of construction, including 
temporary works. 
 
Narrow interpretations of PtD in construction 
Despite ‘cradle-to-grave’ definitions of PtD, research in the construction industry often 
targets a single stage in the life cycle of a building/structure for PtD intervention. For 
example, Cooke et al. (2008) developed a knowledge-based decision support tool to 
provide designers with 'expert' OHS knowledge. Although only a prototype, this tool was 
limited to design features that impacted upon OHS risks during the maintenance of a 
building. Some PtD examples have the potential to reduce OHS risk in both the operation 
of a facility and during construction. For example, the UK’s Health and Safety Executive 
has produced guidance material  in the form of ‘Red, Amber and Green’ lists, which 
identify a number of design solutions that effectively reduce OHS risk in both the 
construction and operation/maintenance stages (HSE, 2012).  
 
PtD policy and legislation 
Prevailing PtD policy and legislation can focus on one stage in the life cycle of a facility, 
at the expense of other stages. For example, in the Australian State of Victoria, Section 
28 of the Occupational Health and Safety Act (2004) requires designers of buildings or 
structures to ensure that buildings or structures are designed to be safe and without risks 
to the health of persons using them as a workplace. WorkSafe Victoria (the OHS 
regulator) has published guidance stating that design of the construction and demolition 
phases of a building or structure’s life cycle are outside the scope of Section 28 
(WorkSafe Victoria, 2005). In the United Kingdom, the Construction Design and 
Management Regulations (2007) establishes broader responsibilities, requiring designers 
to avoid foreseeable risks to any person: (i) carrying out construction work; (ii) liable to 
be affected by such construction work; (iiii) cleaning any window or any transparent or 
translucent wall, ceiling or roof in or on a structure; (iv) maintaining the permanent 
fixtures and fittings of a structure; or (v) using a structure designed as a workplace.  
 
The possibility of trade-offs in risk reduction 
PtD guidance often implicitly assumes design measures that reduce OHS risk in one stage 
of a product’s life cycle are beneficial (or at least have no negative impacts) on OHS risk 
in other life cycle stages. This may be problematic in the construction industry.  Wright et 
al. (2003) foreshadow the possibility of conflict between designing for OHS in the 
construction and operation stages of a facility when discussing the implications of using 
built up, compared to composite panel, roofing systems. Although composite roofing 
systems reduce the need for work at height during installation, they present an increased 
risk of falling during roof maintenance (Wright et al. 2003).  
 
Stakeholder theory 
A common problem inherent in PtD policy is the attribution of responsibility to the 
occupant of an abstract socio-technical role, i.e. “the designer.” Design work in the 
construction industry is an emergent, iterative process in which multiple stakeholders 
interact to shape decisions (Tryggestad et al., 2010; Ewenstein and Whyte, 2007). 
Research reveals how stakeholders’ concerns and priorities change over the life of a 
construction project (Olander 2007). Thomson (2011) presents an industry case study 
revealing that stakeholders’ understanding of what they want from a construction project 
develops through their reflection on emerging design solutions. Thus, rather than viewing 
design as a linear process characterised by stability and predictability, Thomson argues 
design should be regarded as an iterative and reflective process in which stakeholders 
engage in continuous negotiation and learning. 
 
Risk management challenges 
PtD requires the adoption of a risk management method, in which: (i) the impact of 
potential risky events is considered; (ii) strategies for controlling risks are identified; and (iii) 
these strategies inform managerial decision-making (Ridley and Channing 1999, p. 6). 
However, determining the magnitude of a risk is not straightforward. Even technical experts 
have been shown to have widely varying risk perceptions (Slovic et al. 1980).  Risk 
judgements are shaped by the way that a risk problem is framed (Pigeon et al. 1993). 
Research  also reveals how social groups perceive and experience risk differently (see, for 
example, Vlek and Stallen, 1981). Thus, a level of risk that is acceptable to one group, may 
not be to another. Pidgeon (1996) describes ‘plural rationalities’ as competing and equally 
legitimate viewpoints concerning risk. Construction is a complex industry in which those who 
make professional decisions, including those concerning the design of a facility, belong to a 
different social group to those whose health and safety could be affected by those decisions.  
Previous research has revealed significant social differences in judgements about OHS risk in 
the construction industry (Holmes and Gifford, 1997).  In applying risk management to PtD, 
decision makers are expected to consider the potential for  a design to impact on the OHS of 
one or more other social groups, and make decisions that will reduce these risks to being ‘as 
low as is reasonably practicable’ (ALARP).  The application of risk management presents a 
significant challenge as decision-makers must judge ‘how safe is safe enough?’ and decisions 
inevitably involve trading off the risks and benefits of a hazard to all social groups (Starr, 
1969).  In this context it seems useful to explore whether the implementation of PtD involves 
making trade-offs and, if so, how these trade-offs impact upon the OHS of different social 
groups impacted by construction projects. 
 
Aim 
Little research has investigated risk reduction trade-offs in implementing PtD in the 
construction industry. The aim of this research was to investigate PtD decisions and 
outcomes in the construction industry, to gain a better understanding of the relationship 
between designing for OHS in the construction and operation stages of a facility. The 
research is being conducted in both the United States and Australia as part of an 
international collaborative benchmarking study. This paper reports some of the 
Australian findings. Specific research objectives were: 
(1) to describe and analyse how OHS in the construction and operation stages of a 
facility is influenced by decisions about the permanent design of a facility; 
(2) to investigate the interaction between designing for OHS in the construction stage 
and the operation/maintenance stage of a facility; and 
(3) to consider the implications of the interaction between designing for OHS in 
construction and operation for the management of PtD in the construction industry. 
 
Research Methods 
The research adopted a case study approach, favoured for the rich causal data that it 
produces (Orum et al, 1991; Eisenhardt, 1989; Fellows and Liu, 1997; Yin, 1994).  
Data were collected using a number of different methods including: (i) direct observation 
of project team interactions, (ii) interviews with project participants and stakeholders, and 
(iii) inspection of artefacts, such as aspects of the physical worksite and project 
documentation.  
 
Larsson (2007) reports that, when asked to describe their behaviour, people tend to give 
an account closer to the ideal than the manifest. For this reason direct observation of 
project team meetings was essential to gaining an accurate understanding of the reasoning 
and motivation behind design decisions that were made in each case.  The researcher 
attended design team meetings at three different case study construction projects. Projects 
were selected to represent a variety of project types and included a commercial/industrial 
building project, a water infrastructure project and a rail infrastructure project. Projects 
were selected on the basis that all key project participants (including, as a minimum, the 
design consultants, the construction contractor and the client) were willing to participate 
in the research.  
 
Direct observation of project participants was followed by a series of interviews 
concerning the design of selected elements of the facilities. The researcher purposefully 
identified specific design elements for analysis on the basis that these elements illustrated 
the interaction between OHS in the construction and operation stages of the facility. For 
each element, relevant stakeholders were identified and interviewed. The interviews 
explored project stakeholders’ reasoning relevant to design decisions as these decisions 
‘unfolded’ in the project context.  
 
The legislative context 
In Australia, OHS is regulated at the state/territory level. Historically, significant 
differences have existed in statutory OHS requirements across Australia. A recent 
initiative to harmonise OHS legislation across Australia hinged upon the enactment by all 
states and territories of a Model Work Health and Safety Act. However, this 
harmonisation initiative has foundered, with a number of states failing to enact new 
legislation in the requisite timeframe (by January 2012), and jurisdictional differences in 
OHS legislation even in the states in which the Model Act has been adopted. Two of the 
case study projects (one and two) were situated in Victoria. At the time of the data 
collection there was no statutory requirement under the Victorian OHS legislation for 
designers to eliminate or reduce OHS risk to construction personnel (See WorkSafe 
Victoria, 2005). The third case study project was situated in the Australian Capital 
Territory (ACT). In the ACT, Section 22 of the Work Health and Safety Act (2011) 
requires designers of structures to be used as a workplace to design the structure to be 
without health and safety risks to people who use the structure for its intended purpose, as 
well as people who construct the structure or who are engaged any reasonably 
foreseeable activity involving the manufacture, assembly, use, demolition or disposal of 
the structure. Thus, the legislative responsibilities for PtD are considerably broader in the 
ACT than in Victoria. 
 Results 
 
Case information 
Information about the case study projects is provided in Table 1.  Total project value 
ranged from AU$100 million (the food processing facility) to AU$3 million (the 
installation of the centrifuge in a sewerage treatment plant). Two projects were brown 
field sites involving the reconstruction or upgrade of an existing facility. One project (the 
suburban train station) was a green field project. Projects ranged from 6 months (the 
installation plant at a sewerage treatment plant) to 18 months (the suburban train station) 
in duration. In each of the cases changes were made to the design in order to improve the 
OHS of end users. In two of these cases (the food processing facility and the sewerage 
treatment project), the design changes were made after construction had commenced. The 
design change was made at the full conceptual design phase of the suburban train station 
project. 
 
Table 1: Case study overview 
Case 
No. 
Total cost 
of project 
Duration 
of 
project 
Development 
type 
Phase at 
which a 
design change 
was 
introduced 
Design issue Design change 
details 
1. ≈AU$100 
million 
10 
months 
Brown field 
(fire damaged) 
Phase 8 – 
Construction  
Fire rating of 
a large 
isolated 
building  
Installation of a 
fire-rated wall 
with fire rated 
penetrations and a 
sprinkler system. 
2. ≈AU$86 
million 
18 
months 
Green field 
(new train 
station) 
Phase 5 – Full 
conceptual 
design 
Access to a 
new train 
platform 
Installation of a 
new pedestrian 
ramp, in addition 
to stair and lift 
access. 
3. ≈AU$3 
million 
6 months Brown field 
(facility 
upgrade) 
Phase 8 - 
Construction 
Installation of 
a new 
working 
platform 
New cantilever 
platform required 
to be installed, 
providing full 
perimeter access 
to a new, larger 
replacement 
centrifuge. 
Note: The Generic Design and Construction Process Protocol (Kagioglou et al. 1998) was also used to 
identify the project phase in which a change was made to the permanent design. 
 
Case 1 – Fire rating a food processing facility 
The first case arose during the design and reconstruction of a food processing facility 
situated in the outer suburbs of Melbourne. The plant had been partially destroyed by a 
fire in January 2010, resulting in closure and the loss of 1,700 jobs in the local area. To 
prevent the loss of employment in the area, the State Government of Victoria offered 
substantial monetary assistance to the client to support re-construction and fast-tracked 
the planning process to facilitate this. As a consequence of this support, the client decided 
to re-build the plant and appointed a contractor under a ‘design and build’ contract to 
undertake the project.  
 
The client originally requested that a sprinkler system not be installed in the food 
processing building. However, after construction work had commenced, a registered 
building surveyor advised that, if a sprinkler system was not installed, to satisfy the 
Building Code of Australia (BCA), a fire-rated wall would have to be incorporated into 
the building design to reduce the size of the building compartments.  
 
The decision to include a fire wall was consequently made once the primary structure was 
constructed. As the ‘design and build’ contractor’s project manager commented: “We 
were literally putting up a building when we found that our areas were over what we 
thought they were.  Whereas normally you would be in a conceptual design you would 
see it and stop and evaluate it, whereas having been committed to a building out there, 
we had to make the decision [to include a fire wall]. 
 
The original plan was to erect the fire wall using a ‘tilt-up’ panel method of construction.  
However, penetrations would need to be made in the wall to accommodate plant and 
services and, at that stage, the dimensions and locations of penetrations were not known. 
As a result of this uncertainty, it was decided to construct the wall using block work to 
allow for penetrations to be more easily made when the building’s equipment and 
services design was finalised. The project manager commented: “The equipment 
contractors were directly contracted to [the client] and they were hard to pin down.  So 
we always knew that product had to come through…so this issue has see-sawed back and 
forth with the issues that we have had with the openings.”   
 
The local fire authority also played an important role, as it became apparent that the 
building design deviated from the specification standards contained in the BCA, 
necessitating approval of the fire wall design by the fire authority. Notwithstanding a 
decision to construct the building using fire retardant panels, the fire authority advised 
that they would not support the original building design because the design did not 
provide full perimeter access for fire appliances.  
 
Once the plant and equipment design was finalised, the design team discovered that the 
penetrations required in the fire wall were considerably larger than the 600mm² allowed 
for in the existing block work wall. Not only would this necessitate re-work, but it would 
also compromise the fire integrity of the wall. Work commenced to enlarge the 
penetrations, presenting specific OHS risks to workers involved in demolishing sections 
of the block work wall. Once the plant was installed, the installation contractor then 
advised that the openings in the block work wall could have been 40% smaller in size. 
 
To maintain the integrity of the firewall, the penetrations were in-filled to the recalculated 
sizing. However, this reconstruction had to take place after the fixed plant was already 
installed and workers had restricted access to the work area. The construction of the 
penetrations required that the block work be cut and the flashed with stainless steel to 
adhere to the food safety regulator’s requirements.  Whilst the openings were not high in 
the wall, scaffolding was required to provide access.  
 
The openings in the firewall remained a subject of contention.  The fire authority 
maintained that the block work wall could no longer act as a firewall when it included 
penetrations. In the opinion of the fire authority, the building was an oversized single 
building that required a sprinkler system to comply with the BCA.  
 
An assessment was commissioned from a fire engineer who advised that ‘fire tunnels’ 
would be required either side of the wall to stop the spread of fire, smoke and heat. The 
size (or length) of the tunnels was to be proportional to the size of the openings - the 
larger the opening, the longer the tunnel.  However, limited space was available for the 
construction of fire tunnels as fixed plant had already been installed either side of the fire 
wall. The original design for the tunnel required a 2.5 metre length, for which there was 
insufficient space.  A reduction in the size of the openings permitted a reduction in tunnel 
length to 1.8 metres. The construction of the fire tunnel commenced without the fire 
authority’s approval, in order not to fall behind the project schedule. In the event, the fire 
authority did not approve this design, insisting on the installation of a full sprinkler 
system to the building. In order to obtain approval for the building design, the client 
agreed to retro-fit the building with a sprinkler system after the start-up of production.  
 
The late inclusion of a sprinkler system into the design meant that the installation 
presented specific OHS challenges as workers needed to negotiate existing plant and 
services located in the ceiling, a confined space. Another area of OHS concern was 
access to the underside of the ceiling to install the sprinkler heads.  Fixed plant and 
equipment had been installed in the building, which could not be moved to provide space 
for access equipment. Further, the production plant was operational when the sprinkler 
system was installed, providing only a short window of opportunity to carry out the work.  
 
Case Two –Construction of a suburban train station platform 
 
The second case arose during the design and construction of a suburban train station in 
Melbourne. As part of a major investment in public transport infrastructure the State 
Government of Victoria committed to the construction of a new railway station in an area 
of rapid population growth.  A concept design was released and construction 
organizations were invited to tender for the design and construction of the station.   
 
The original concept involved the construction of a new ‘island’ platform, built between 
two existing and fully functioning rail lines.  A pedestrian footbridge was to be built, 
spanning the full width of the tracks.  Access to the platforms from the footbridge was to 
be provided by stairs at either end and in the middle of the footbridge. In accordance with 
disabled access requirements, an alternative means of accessing the platform by provision 
of a lift was also included in the original concept design.  
 
However, before the contract was awarded, an incident occurred at a similar rail station in 
Melbourne. This incident involved the death of a passenger who could not be removed 
safely from an island platform because the ambulance trolley would not fit in the 
platform lift.  Consequently, paramedics were forced to remove the passenger by walking 
over ‘live’ rail tracks. 
 
Compounding concerns about access to and egress from station platforms was a growing 
number of passenger complaints about station lifts breaking down. A state election 
resulted in a new Liberal Government, which immediately initiated a review of design 
policy for rail stations. Requirements were introduced specifying that all new stations 
would be installed with lifts able to accommodate a standard ambulance trolley and an 
alternative means of access in the form of a ramp would also be provided. This new 
policy was introduced just two weeks after tenders closed for the railway station project 
and companies that had tendered for the project were given two weeks to amend their 
proposals.  
 
The contract was eventually awarded to a design and construction contractor on the basis 
of a proposal that included a number of changes to the original concept design. The 
contractor considered that these changes would provide a quicker and more cost effective 
construction method, while also reducing the OHS risk to construction workers. For 
example, the platform structure was redesigned to reduce the number of supporting piers 
from three rows to two, with a cantilevered steel framed platform. This change increased 
the separation between the construction work zone and the ‘live’ train tracks, allowing 
trains to continue operating, providing a ‘safety corridor’ between trains and construction 
activities and reducing the frequency of exposure to hazards associated with the pier 
construction.   
 
However, the late inclusion of a ramp in the design resulted in emergent hazards during 
the construction stage which were not envisaged at the tendering stage. A post-award risk 
assessment (involving the client, the rail operator and design and construction contractor) 
was conducted once the project commenced. This risk assessment focused primarily on 
the health and safety of passengers and the public, i.e. end users of the station. The risk of 
persons jumping over the ramp balustrading onto an adjoining canopy was identified as a 
major risk.  The contractor commented: “When we priced and sketched up [the proposed 
design] at tender stage, no ramp was included.  We were only given two weeks.  We had 
already put our price in and it was a last minute change by the client….. No one picked 
up at the time about the canopies being bisected [by the ramp]”.  To address this risk, 
‘throw screens’ were designed to be fixed to the ramp balustrading to reduce the risk of 
people climbing or throwing objects over the side. The risk assessment also identified the 
need to provide landings at regular intervals on the ramp to provide ‘rest’ areas.  
 
The addition of the ramp, the landings and throw screens had a significant impact on the 
design and construction of the station. The sizing of columns supporting the ramp had to 
be substantially changed, with some columns more than doubling in size due to the 
inclusion of landings and throw screens.  Size increases to the platform’s steel structure 
were also required to safely support the increased loads associated with the ramp and 
larger columns.  As a result of these changes, construction workers’ exposure to hazards 
associated with crane lifts was significantly increased. Additional platform components 
needed to be lifted into place and the larger size of structural members reduced 
manoevreability and increased risk.  Workers’ ability to control these lifts was a 
particular safety concern and the rail lines had to be closed on the days of the lifting 
operations. Further, the reduced clearance between the underside of platform beams, 
which had doubled in depth, and the ground meant that services originally planned to be 
connected to the underside of each beam had to be relocated due to restricted access 
clearances.  Thus, a series of holes had to be cut into every intersecting beam for the 
length of the platform (approx. 100m), to allow conduit to be installed to accommodate 
services. The steel beams had been fabricated without any penetrations, so the in-situ 
cutting of holes presented new hazards associated the use of cutting equipment in an area 
that was already difficult to access. 
 
Case Three – Installation of a centrifuge in a sewerage treatment facility 
 
The third case arose during the design and construction of sewerage infrastructure in the 
Australian Capital Territory.  To ensure effective delivery of a long term, on-going 
capital works programme the client established an alliance with an external provider, 
with primary focus placed on renewal and upgrade of existing infrastructure.  A review 
into the operation of existing facilities revealed that some of the pumping equipment no 
longer complied with legislative requirements, could not meet forecasted community 
demands and was infeasible to maintain and operate. The client organization developed a 
plan to upgrade four smaller sewerage pumps to three bigger pumps.  The replacement of 
each pump was to be staggered over a 10 year period.   
 
At the procurement stage of the project it became apparent that a centrifuge that was to be 
incorporated into the original design to replace two original pumps would not meet 
capacity requirements for the facility. Following a review of alterative options, a larger 
centrifuge that met all operational criteria was identified and purchased.  The centrifuge 
was to be located on a mezzanine level of a pumping station with an adjoining void equal 
in height to that of a six storey building.  Permanent edge protection was provided to the 
perimeter of the mezzanine, providing a safe work area.  However, during installation it 
became apparent that, due to the size of the larger centrifuge, safe access to all areas of 
the centrifuge was not available.  One end of the centrifuge butted up to the safety 
balustrading around the void, preventing access at this location.  Access to all areas of the 
centrifuge was required to allow for ongoing maintenance of the facility.  To reposition 
the centrifuge in the allocated space would require major alterations to equipment and 
infrastructure.  To overcome the accessibility issue, a small purpose-built platform was 
designed to provide safe clearance and access to the end of the centrifuge, closest to the 
void.  This design incorporated a steel platform attached to the edge of the concrete 
mezzanine floor which housed the centrifuge. This platform was to cantilever out over 
the void and would provide a safe ‘walkway’ around the perimeter of the centrifuge as 
well as providing a platform from which periodic maintenance of the centrifuge could 
take place.  
 
A design brief was prepared by the project management team specifying the size, use and 
location of the platform and a structural engineer was engaged to design the platform.  
Access for the designer to measure and review the area was limited and so the platform 
was designed to allow for some flexibility in its construction.  This was achieved by 
incorporating joints that could be welded rather than having to rely on aligning bolt holes.  
 
The installation of the platform created some specific challenges for the construction 
contractor. While a large portion of the platform was erected off site, access to the edge 
of the slab was still needed to fix the platform into position.  Due to the height of the void 
and lack of any secure structure to ‘tie in’ the scaffold, a standard scaffold configuration, 
built from the ground up would have been unstable.  A specialist scaffolding contractor 
was engaged to design and install a temporary cantilever scaffold, with hazards 
associated with working at heights identified as a major risk during scaffold erection and 
dismantling. Due to the size and weight of the partially completed platform, a crane was 
needed to move the structure into position.  Existing plant and infrastructure sharing the 
work space severely hampered crane movements, increasing the risk associated with this 
activity. Damage to any of the existing infrastructure resulting from contact with the 
crane or the platform could have resulted in falling objects and/or exposure to hazardous 
substances. The requirement for on-site welding of the platform also elevated the risk to 
construction workers during the installation. Hazards associated with the welding 
included exposure to fumes and gases, burns, heat and noise. To mitigate the risks 
associated with welding, the construction workers were required to wear cumbersome 
protective clothing which, given that the work was carried out during the summer months 
and within close proximity to an industrial heater, presented new hazards associated with 
heat stress and fatigue.  
 
Discussion 
 
Tensions between construction and operational safety 
The case examples reveal complexity inherent in construction design and the tensions 
that can emerge between designing a facility for safe construction and operation. In all 
three cases, design decisions that were taken in order to reduce health and/or safety risk 
when the facility was operational, resulted in increased OHS risk during construction. 
These examples illustrate how design decisions that improve OHS in one life cycle stage 
of a facility (e.g. operation/maintenance) do not automatically reduce OHS risks in other 
stages (e.g. construction) and may, in some circumstances, actually increase risk in some 
respects. Chinyio and Akintoye (2008) suggest trade-offs are an essential aspect of 
managing construction projects because the expectations of all stakeholders can rarely be 
achieved at the same time. Starr (1969) considered ‘accepted’ accident levels in society to 
be an indicator of society’s preferred trade-offs between the risk and benefits of a hazard. 
Similarly, the case examples suggest that trade-offs between OHS in construction and 
end use are an unstated but inherent feature of design practice in the construction 
industry. Publications offering PtD guidance to construction design professionals 
currently say little about the potential for these tensions. It is very important that PtD 
policy documents and guidance notes provide practical guidance about how to identify 
and manage conflict (and possibly trade-offs) in reducing OHS risk across the life cycle 
of a facility. 
 
 
Design instability 
Design uncertainty and design change were key features of all three case examples.  The 
cases reveal the emergent (and often unanticipated) nature of design-related hazards in 
construction projects, many of which relate to inherent uncertainty and/or changes to a 
design. This is consistent with Tryggestad et al. (2010) who demonstrate that design is a 
political and reflexive process of collective negotiation. In this context, uncertainty is 
prevalent and design goals are subject to change. The emergent nature of design-related 
OHS hazards illustrates problems associated with the application of standard OHS risk 
management protocols in the dynamic context of construction design. OHS risk 
management protocols assume that design is stable at a reasonably early stage and that all 
foreseeable hazards can be identified and subject to risk assessment and risk control. The 
lack of design stability in each of the case examples reveals problems inherent in the use 
of linear risk management methodologies to deal with PtD in construction projects. This 
is particularly well illustrated in the case of the train station project, in which the design 
and construction contractor’s original proposal addressed issues of OHS during 
construction relevant to the original design concept. However, a post-award risk 
assessment, which focused primarily on the safety of end users of the facility, resulted in 
changes which introduced new, significant and unforeseen OHS hazards in the 
construction stage. 
 
The role of external stakeholders 
Another noteworthy feature of the case examples is the significant influence exerted by 
parties external to the project, whose actions substantially shaped design decisions (and 
their OHS consequences).  In the case of the food processing facility, the local fire 
authority played a major role in shaping the design of the facility through their 
interpretation of the requirements of the BCA. In the case of the suburban rail station, the 
State Government of Victoria played a key role in the issue of new design requirements 
two weeks after the original tender for the project had closed. This finding is consistent 
with Olander (2007) who presents empirical evidence indicating that external 
stakeholders have a substantial impact during the planning and design stages of a 
construction project. 
 
The role played by external stakeholders is often overlooked by proponents of PtD. The 
case examples reflect the need to understand construction design as a complex socio-
technical system in which PtD outcomes emerge as a result of interactions between 
stakeholders. Olander and Landin (2008) argue that early acknowledgement of the 
interests of external stakeholders and the implementation of communication that is open, 
trustworthy, cooperative, respectful and informative can help to avoid project disruption. 
The early engagement of external stakeholders may also have avoided some of the OHS 
risks that emerged in our case study projects. Many external stakeholders are likely to 
have a greater interest in the operation of a facility, with the result that stakeholder 
influence in shaping designs could actually militate against decisions that would reduce 
the OHS risk experienced by construction workers. The role and interests of external 
stakeholders in shaping PtD outcomes in the construction industry deserves further 
analysis. 
 
Conclusions 
 
Development of PtD knowledge 
The findings reveal the importance of understanding the emergent nature of design 
decision-making and the role of multiple stakeholders in negotiating design trade-offs 
(and PtD outcomes) in the construction industry.  Previous PtD research has suggested 
technology-based tools to improve PtD outcomes, including decision support systems 
(Davison, 2003; Cooke et al., 2008), visualisation (Hadikusumo and Rowlinson, 2004) 
and building information models (Toole and Gambatese 2008; Sulankivi et al. 2010; 
Kamardeen, 2010).  If these tools are to be used effectively, it is important to understand 
the context and conditions which would support or impede their adoption. For example, it 
may be unrealistic to assume early design stability in certain circumstances. Further, the 
significant role played by external stakeholders (see also Olander 2007) suggests that 
stakeholder management strategies could be usefully applied to PtD in the construction 
context. 
 
Implications for policy and practice 
The analysis of these case examples raises the question of how best to identify and 
manage tensions that might arise between reducing OHS risk in the construction and 
operation/maintenance stages of a facility’s life cycle. The question of what to do when a 
design solution to reduce OHS risk to end users of a facility will increase OHS risk to 
construction workers presents legal, ethical and practical problems. Recourse could be 
taken to the OHS legislation which, in Victoria at least, would suggest designers should 
focus their efforts on risk to the end users of a facility, though the inclusive wording of 
the ACT’s legislation would not permit such a simple resolution. A practical risk 
management approach might lead decision-makers to consider the relative magnitude of 
the risk in each stage of the life cycle. For example, the length of exposure to a hazard in 
the operation/maintenance stage of a facility could be weighed against the relatively short 
term exposure to a hazard in the construction stage. Other considerations might reflect the 
ability of a construction contractor, relative to the ability of the general public to manage 
an OHS risk effectively. The question of voluntary versus involuntary exposure may also 
arise (See, also Slovic et al. 1980). However, there is an ethical dimension to these 
questions, which hinges on the acceptability, when thinking about PtD, of privileging end 
users’ OHS at the expense of the health and safety of construction workers. The case 
examples suggest that the focus on end users is often driven by external stakeholders and, 
at least in Victoria, this appears to be reflected in the legislation. It is important that PtD 
policy-makers and practitioners recognise the potential for tension in designing for safety 
across the various life cycle stages of a facility. It is important that decision-makers 
engage in open consultation with all stakeholders (including constructors) and make 
explicit the basis for making trade-offs when these situations occur.  
 
Limitations and future research 
The research was limited by the number of case studies. We are unable to generalise the 
findings to the industry as a whole and make no attempt to do so. However, the cases 
demonstrate that decisions made to improve the safety of end users of a facility can, in 
some circumstances, impact negatively on the OHS of construction workers. The 
research was also limited in its focus on trade-offs between OHS during construction and 
end use of a facility. There may also be significant impacts for deconstruction, demolition 
and/or the refurbishment of a facility. No attempt was made to evaluate the efficacy of 
any particular risk management approach or to consider the risk tolerance of relevant 
social groups (e.g. designers, construction workers and end users). Future research should 
address these issues. The question arises whether certain project delivery methods lend 
themselves to improved PtD outcomes. It is expected that integrated project delivery, 
early contractor involvement and collaborative forms of procurement would enhance the 
opportunity to identify design solutions that reduce OHS risk in both the construction and 
operation stages of a facility’s life cycle. Research is ongoing in projects procured in a 
variety of different ways to investigate this proposition. 
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